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Abstract: The vast literature on party identification has gradually become bogged down by 
disputes  about  how  to  interpret  observational  data.  This  paper  proposes  the  use  of 
experimental designs to shed light on the responsiveness of party identification to short term 
forces such as retrospective performance evaluations. Examples of recent field experiments are 
used to illustrate two types of experimental designs and the assumptions on which they rest.
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1. Introduction
The vast behavioral  literature on party identification 
has  been  propelled  by  a  series  of  methodological 
innovations.  The  initial  conceptualization  of  party 
identification as an enduring attachment that shapes 
the  way  in  which  voters  view  political  figures  and 
issues [1] was prompted by the growth and develop-
ment  of  survey  research  in  the  early  1950s,  and 
theoretical  refinements  followed as  surveys  became 
more widespread and sophisticated [2–4]. During the 
mid-1970s, nonrecursive statistical models became part 
of the political science toolkit, and a torrent of studies 
called  into  question  the  assumption  that  causation 
flows in one direction from party attachments to issue 
positions  [5,6],  performance  evaluations  [7,8],  and 
candidate evaluations [9]. This line of attack drew on a 
wide  array  of  surveys,  including  several  conducted 
outside  the  United  States  [10]. By  the  mid-1980s, 
political scientists had grown deeply skeptical of the 
view that  party identification is  an unmoved mover, 
developed early in life and unresponsive to short-term 
changes  in  the  political  environment.  The  simulta-
neous  equations  models  of  the  1970s  and  early 
1980s,  however, came under criticism in the wake of 
another methodological development, the analysis of 
covariance structures as a means of addressing biases 
due to measurement error. Response error was said to 
produce  a  variety  of  statistical  artifacts,  leading 
scholars  to  exaggerate  the  rate  of  partisan  change 
[11,12] and  the  responsiveness  of  partisanship  to 
short-term  shifts in  the  way  that  voters  evaluate 
incumbent performance and candidates' issue stances 
[13] in a variety of cross-national settings  ([14], but 
see  [15–17]).  The  most  recent  methodological 
innovation was the analysis of aggregate survey data, 
made possible by the accumulation of several decades 
of  quarterly  polling  data  by  commercial  and  news 
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organizations  [18].  This  evidence was initially  inter-
preted as demonstrating the malleability of partisan-
ship  in  the  wake  of  economic  fluctuations  and 
scandals,  although  subsequent  work  that  took 
sampling  variability  [19,20] and  question  wording 
effects [21] into account tempered this conclusion. 
Each wave of methodological innovation has intro-
duced new evidence into  debates  about  the nature 
and  origins  of  party  attachments,  but  uncertainty 
remains about how to interpret the results given the 
welter of competing methodological claims. The study 
of  partisanship  currently  finds  itself  in  a  state  of 
deadlock  between  theoretical  perspectives  that  em-
phasize the stability of partisan identities (and social 
identities more generally) in polities where the parties 
and  their  social  constituencies  are  stable  [22]  and 
theoretical perspectives that regard partisanship as a 
running tally of past performance evaluations [7,23], a 
summary  of  expectations  about  future  performance 
[24], or a manifestation of voters' ideological proxim-
ity to the parties [6,15].
How might researchers break this deadlock? Many 
of  the  central  debates  ultimately  come  down  to 
questions  of  causal  inference.  The  reason  meth-
odological  debates  about  two-way  causal  flows, 
measurement  error,  and  other  specification  issues 
have played such a prominent role in the literature on 
party identification is that the evidence base is almost 
entirely  drawn  from  nonexperimental  research.
Cross-sectional surveys, panel surveys, and aggregate 
time-series furnish the data analyst with variation in 
partisanship  and variation  in  the  putative  causes  of 
partisanship. What to make of the correlation between 
these two sets of variables hinges on the substantive 
modeling assumptions that researchers bring to bear 
when  analyzing  the  data.  Do  voters' policy  views 
cause  them to  adjust  their  partisan  attachments  in 
light of party platforms, or  do voters instead follow 
party leaders' pronouncements on prominent issues of 
the day [25]? Or do correlations between policy views 
and party attachments reflect  unmeasured variables 
with  which  they  are  both  correlated?  Sorting  out 
cause and effect statistically requires the researcher 
to trace this correlation to some putatively exogenous 
initial  conditions.  For  example,  in  cross-sectional 
analysis (e.g., [5]), the identifying assumption is that 
certain  demographic  variables  predict  issue  stances 
but  are  unrelated  to  omitted  causes  of  party 
identifications. In panel analysis, the core assumption 
is slightly weaker: subjects' background attributes and 
prior attitudes are related to current partisanship only 
insofar as they influence contemporary issue stances 
and performance evaluations (e.g., [8]). In time-series 
analysis,  the  identifying  assumptions  are  somewhat 
more complex because they involve a range of propo-
sitions about how partisanship and short-term forces 
are  measured  over  time  and  how the  dynamics  of 
each  series  are  modeled  [19,23,26].  Each  of  the 
competing  modeling  approaches  involves  strong  and 
untestable  modeling  assumptions.  New  statistical 
techniques (e.g., matching) that introduce untestable 
assumptions of their own are unlikely to advance this 
literature.  Even  if  voters  who  harbor  different  policy 
views  were  precisely  matched  in  terms  of  their 
measured  attributes,  a  researcher  might  still  wonder 
whether  their  different  partisan  attachments  reflect 
unmeasured attributes,  such as  pre-adult  socialization 
experiences, that are correlated with policy stances [27].
During the past decade, largely in response to the 
kinds  of  identification  problems  just  mentioned, 
another methodological innovation has taken root in 
the  social  sciences.  Increasingly,  researchers  in 
political  science  and  economics  have  turned  to 
randomized experiments in  order to facilitate causal 
inference.  Experimental  designs  by  no  means 
eliminate problems of inference, but they nonetheless 
represent an important advance that, at a minimum, 
calls  attention  to  subtle  issues  of  identification  and 
interpretation.  This  essay discusses a pair  of recent 
studies  that  illustrate  two  broad  classes  of 
experimental designs. The first addresses the question 
of what kinds of  stimuli  cause people to alter their 
partisan  attachments;  the  second  addresses  the 
question  of  what  downstream  consequences  follow 
from an exogenously-induced change in partisanship. 
We begin by introducing the logic of  inference that 
underlies  randomized  experiments,  discuss  the 
identification strategies that underlie each study, and 
suggest how an experimental agenda might advance 
the literature on party identification.
2. Inference from Direct and Downstream Experi-
ments
Randomized experiments—and research designs that 
attempt  to  approximate  random  assignment—are 
often  explicated  in  terms  of  a  potential  outcome 
framework [28,29]. The advantages of this framework 
for statistical practice are twofold: it makes clear what 
is  meant  by  causal  influence  and  encourages 
researchers to attempt to estimate causal parameters 
without  invoking the  assumption  that  all  individuals 
are  subject  to  the  same  treatment  effect.  These 
advantages  have  special  value  for  the  literature  on 
party  identification,  which  tends  to  gloss  over 
important  issues of  identification,  especially  as  they 
pertain  to  variation  in  treatment  effects  from  one 
person  to  the  next.  What  follows  is  a  brief  intro-
duction to the potential outcomes framework, drawing 
on the more extensive presentation in [30].
Before  delving  into  the  specifics  of  how  parti-
sanship is influenced by other factors, such as voters' 
economic assessments or policy stances, let's consider 
the problem of causal inference in abstract terms. We 
7
begin by supposing that each person  i harbors two 
potential outcomes. Let Y i (0) be i's partisanship if i is 
not  exposed  to  the  treatment,  and Y i (1) be  i's 
partisanship if  i is  exposed  to  the  treatment.  The 
treatment effect is defined as:
τ i≡Y i(1)−Y i (0) (1)
In other words, the treatment effect is defined as 
the  difference  between  two  potential  states  of  the 
world,  one  in  which  the  individual  receives  the 
treatment, and another in which the individual does 
not. Extending this logic from a single individual to a 
set of individuals, we may define the average treat-
ment effect (ATE) as follows:
ATE≡E [τ i ]=E [Y i (1)]−E [Y i(0 )] (2)
where E [∙ ] indicates  an  expectation  over  all  sub-
jects.  Although  empirical  research  may  serve  many 
purposes,  one principal  aim is to estimate the ATE, 
the average effect of introducing some sort of infor-
mation, policy, or incentive.
In an actual experiment or observational study, we 
observe subjects in either their treated or untreated 
states.  Let Di denote  the  treatment  status  of  each 
subject,  where Di = 1 if  treated  and  0  if  not.  The 
difference  in  expected  outcomes  among  those  who 
are treated and those who are not treated may be 
expressed as:
E [Y i(1)│Di=1]−E [Y i(0)│ Di=0] (3)
where the  notation E [Ai│Di=B] means the average 
value  of Ai among  those  subjects  for  which  the 
condition Di=B holds.  For example,  one could  com-
pare  average  outcomes  (party  identification  scores) 
among  those  who  evaluate  the  economy  positively
(Di=1) to  average  outcomes  among  those  who 
evaluate the economy negatively (Di=0) .
In  a  typical  observational  study,  the  observed 
difference in partisanship between those who evaluate 
the economy positively or negatively may not, in expec-
tation, reveal the average causal effect of economic 
perceptions.  We observe  average  outcomes  for  the 
treated  subjects  in  their  treated  state  and  average 
outcomes of the untreated subjects in their untreated 
state. To see how this quantity is different, in expec-
tation, from the ATE, we rewrite Equation (3) as:
 (4)
In  other  words,  the  expected  difference  in 
outcomes  of  the  treated  and  untreated  can  be 
decomposed  into  the  sum  of  two  quantities:  the 
average treatment effect for a subset of the subjects 
(the treated), and a selection bias term. The selection 
bias term (in braces) is the difference between what 
the outcome Y i (0) would have been for those who are 
treated had they not been treated and the value of 
Y i (0) observed among those who were not treated. 
The threat of selection bias arises whenever systematic 
processes determine which people receive treatment. 
In  this  example,  if  people  choose  the  sorts  of 
economic  news  they  read  and  remember,  expected 
Y i (0) potential  outcomes  may  be  quite  different 
among those who evaluate the economy positively or 
negatively.
Random assignment solves the selection problem. 
When  random  assignment  determines  which  treat-
ment  each  subject  receives, Di is  independent  of 
potential outcomes. Those randomly selected into the 
treatment group have the same expected outcomes in 
the  treated  state  as  those  randomly  assigned  to 
remain untreated (control group):
E [Y i(1 )│ Di=1 ]=E [Y i(1)│Di=0 ]=E [Y i(1)]  (5)
By the same token, those randomly assigned to the 
control  group  have  the  same  expected Y i(0) out-
comes as those assigned to the treatment group:
E [Y i(0)│ Di=0]=E [Y i (0)│Di=1]=E [Y i (0)] (6)
Equations (5) and (6) reveal  why, when subjects 
are randomly treated, the selection bias term vanishes 
and  the  difference  between  treatment  and  control 
group averages provides an unbiased estimate of the 
ATE.  This  identification  result  can  be  shown  by 
substituting Equations (5) and (6) into Equation (3):
E [Y i(1)│ Di=1]−E [Y i(0)│ Di=0]=E [Y i (1)]−E [Y i(0)] (7)
This proof demonstrates an attractive property of 
randomized experiments. At the same time, it glosses 
over two implicit assumptions. One assumption, which 
plays a minor role in the analysis that follows, is the 
stable  unit  treatment  value  assumption  [29],  which 
stipulates that potential outcomes do not depend on 
which  subjects  are  assigned  to  treatment.  This 
assumption  is  jeopardized,  for  example,  when  the 
treatment administered to one subject affects the out-
comes  of  other  subjects.  More  pertinent  to  our 
discussion  below  is  the  exclusion  restriction  as-
sumption [31], which requires that outcomes respond 
solely to the treatment itself and not to the assigned 
treatment or other backdoor causal pathways that are 
set  in  motion  by  the  assignment  to  treatment  or 
control. For example, we must assume that when we 
randomly  assign  economic  evaluations,  we  are  not 
inadvertently  deploying  other  treatments,  such  as 
information  about  the  party  platforms  on  environ-
mental issues.
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E [(Y i(1)−Y i(0))│ Di=1 ]
+{E [Y i(0)│ Di=1]−E [Y i(0)│ Di=0]}
Readers may be wondering whether an experiment 
could  feasibly  assign  how  people  evaluate  the 
economy. The answer is probably not, and we must 
therefore  introduce  another  layer  of  notation  to 
describe the imperfect translation of  intended treat-
ments into actual treatments. Let Z i=1 if a subject is 
assigned  to  the  treatment  group,  and  Z i=0 if  the 
subject  is  assigned to the control  group.  In experi-
ments with full compliance, all those assigned to the 
treatment  group (Z i=1) also  receive  the  treatment
(Di=1) , and all those assigned to the control group
(Z i=0) are  untreated (Di=0) .  In  experiments  with 
some degree  of  noncompliance,  Di(z )≠Z i .  Encour-
agement designs, for example, attempt to induce some 
subjects  to  take  the  treatment Di but  recognize  that 
there may be some subjects  who will fail to do so or 
who will take the treatment even when not encouraged. 
In  the  context  of  experiments  that  encounter 
noncompliance,  the  exclusion  restriction  holds  that 
Y i(d , z)=Y i(d ) for  all  values  of  d and  z.  In  other 
words,  potential  outcomes  respond  solely  to  actual 
treatment, not assigned treatment. Consider a recent 
survey experiment by Middleton  [32] that randomly 
encourages  some  subjects  to  read  upbeat  news 
stories about the economy (Z i) in an effort to change 
their  assessment  of  national  economic  conditions 
(Di) ,  which  in  turn  may  affect  their  partisanship 
(Y i) . The causal effect of interest is the influence of 
Di on Y i , but Di itself is not randomly assigned. The 
exclusion restriction holds that assignment Z i has no 
influence on Y i except insofar as it affects Di , which 
in turn affects Y i . In other words, the encouragement 
to read a news story is assumed to affect partisanship 
only insofar  as the encouragement changes assess-
ments of national economic conditions.
In order to recover the causal effect of Di on  Y i
using an encouragement design, we need one further 
assumption known as  monotonicity  [31].  Describing 
this  assumption  requires  a  bit  more  terminology. 
Depending  on  the  way  their  received  treatments 
potentially respond to treatment assignment, subjects 
may  be  classified  into  four  types,  Compliers,  Never-
takers,  Always-takers,  and  Defiers.  Compliers  are 
subjects who take the treatment if and only if assigned 
to  the  treatment.  For  this  group  Di(1)−Di(0 )=1 . 
Never-takers are those who are always untreated no 
matter their assignment: Di(1)=Di(0)=0 . Conversely, 
Always-takers  are those who are always treated no 
matter their assignment: Di(1)=Di(0)=1 . Defiers are 
those who take the treatment if and only if they are 
assigned to the control group: Di(1)−Di(0)=−1 . The 
monotonicity assumption stipulates that there are no 
Defiers.  In  context  of  our  running  example,  when 
assigned  to  receive  upbeat  economic  news,  every-
one's economic assessments either remain unchanged 
or  become  more  buoyant.  Notice  that  the  mono-
tonicity assumption has nothing to do with potential 
outcomes  concerning  partisanship, Y i .  Monotonicity 
refers  only  to  the  relationship  between  assigned 
treatment and actual treatment.
Under  the  stable  unit  treatment  value,  exclusion 
restriction,  and  monotonicity  assumptions,  one  can 
identify the ATE among Compliers [31]. This quantity, 
the Complier  Average Causal  Effect  (CACE),  is  esti-
mated by dividing two quantities. The numerator in 
Equation (8) is the average outcome in the assigned 
treatment group minus the average outcome in the as-
signed control group; the denominator is the observed 
rate of treatment in the assigned treatment minus the 
observed rate of treatment in the control group:
(8)
This ratio is equivalent to the estimate generated 
by  an instrumental  variables regression of Y i on Di
using Z i as  an  instrumental  variable.  Because  the 
denominator  is  a  difference between two quantities 
that  are subject  to  sampling variability,  this  ratio  is 
consistent but not unbiased and becomes undefined 
when  the  treatment  rate  in  the  two  experimental 
groups  is  the  same.  Precise  estimation  requires  a 
substantial difference in treatment rates, a point that 
has special importance for the analysis of what Green 
and Gerber [33] refer to as downstream experiments. 
A downstream experiment is one in which an initial 
randomization causes a change in an outcome, and 
this outcome is then considered a treatment affecting 
a subsequent  outcome.  For example,  in  Middleton's 
study  of  news  coverage  on  economic  assessments 
[32], subjects in an internet survey were assigned to 
read newspaper coverage of the 2008 economic crisis. 
Random assignment produced a change in economic 
evaluations.  A  downstream  analysis  might  examine 
the consequences of changing economic evaluations 
on  party  identification.  This  analysis  parallels  an 
encouragement  design  in  terms  of  its  underlying 
assumptions  (stable  unit  treatment  value,  exclusion 
restriction,  monotonicity),  mode  of  analysis  (instru-
mental  variables  regression),  and  causal  estimand 
(the  CACE).  Of  special  importance  is  the  exclusion 
restriction, which holds that exposure to news stories 
had  no  effect  on  party  identification  through  paths 
other  than  economic  evaluations.  When  these 
assumptions  are  met,  the  experimenter  obtains 
consistent estimates of the ATE among Compliers, who 
are in this case those whose economic evaluations are 
favorable if and only if they are exposed to the news 
stories. In order to estimate the CACE with reasonable 
power, there must be ample numbers of Compliers, 
which is  to say that the news stories  must  have a 
sizable  impact  on  economic  evaluations.  Small 
numbers of Compliers also mean that a slight violation 
of the exclusion restriction may lead to severe bias. 
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ĈACE=
(Ê [Y i│Z i=1 ]−Ê [Y i│Z i=0 ])
(Ê [Di│Z i=1]−Ê [Di│Zi=0])
Thus,  the  most  informative  experiments  are  those 
that  set  in  motion  substantial  changes  in  causal 
variables, such as economic assessments.
In sum, random assignment allows researchers to 
sidestep  the  selection  problem,  but  important 
assumptions remain. Both full-compliance and encour-
agement  designs  force  the  researcher  to  impose 
exclusion restrictions. Encouragement designs require 
the additional assumption of monotonicity and confine 
the causal estimand to the average treatment effect 
among Compliers. Whether one can safely generalize 
from the ATE among Compliers to the ATE for other 
subgroups is an open question that may be addressed 
empirically through replication using different sorts of 
encouragements ([30], chapter 6). 
From the standpoint of estimation, this framework 
departs markedly from the way in which researchers 
typically  analyze  observational  data.  Using  the 
estimator  described  in  Equation  (8),  a  researcher 
compares  subjects  according  to  their  experimental 
assignments,  not  according  to  the  treatments  they 
actually  receive.  Precise estimation requires that the 
assigned treatments bear a reasonably strong relation-
ship to the treatments that subjects actually receive. In 
other words, the use of instrumental variables regres-
sion  to  estimate  the  CACE requires  an experimental 
design that generates ample numbers of Compliers.
In  order  to  see  these  assumptions  and  design 
considerations in action,  we next consider a pair of 
recent experiments. The first assesses the influence of 
information  about  incumbent  performance  on  party 
identification. The second considers the downstream 
effects  of  randomly-induced  party  registration  on 
party  identification.  Because  the  technical  issues 
surrounding the downstream study are more complex, 
we discuss the experiment in more detail.
3. Chong et al. (2011) [34]
Chong, De La O, Karlan, and Wantchekon [34] report 
the results of a field experiment conducted in Mexico 
shortly  before  its  2009  municipal  elections.  Their 
intervention followed in the wake of a federal audit of 
municipal governments. These audits graded munici-
pal  governments  according  to  whether  they  had 
accounting irregularities indicative of corruption; the 
auditors also noted whether local administrators had 
failed to spend federal grant money, suggesting a low 
level  of  administrative  competence.  The researchers 
conducted  a  precinct-level  leafleting  campaign  de-
signed  to  publicize  some  aspect  of  the  auditors' 
reports. Some 1,910 precincts were randomly selected 
to  a  control  group  that  received  no  leaflets.  Three 
random subsets of 150 precincts apiece each received 
one  type  of  treatment  flyer.  The  first  treatment 
publicized the degree to which the municipality failed 
to spend federal  grant funds. The second publicized 
the failure to spend grant funds that were supposed 
to  aid  the  poor.  A  third  graded  the  municipality 
according to the amount of evidence of corruption.
Much  of  the  authors' report  focuses  on  how 
precinct-level vote outcomes changed in the wake of 
the leafleting campaign; for  our purposes,  the rele-
vant  part  of  the  study examines  the  effects  of  the 
intervention  on  individual-level  attitudes  of  750 
respondents  who  were  sampled  from  75  of  the 
precincts and surveyed two weeks after the election. 
Since Mexican elected officials are forbidden to seek 
reelection,  voter  displeasure  cannot  be  directed  at 
incumbent  candidates;  the  relevant  target  is  the 
incumbent  party.  Chong  et  al.  find  that  negative 
report cards addressing corruption (but not failure to 
spend  grant  money)  significantly  diminish  respon-
dents' approval  of  the  incumbent  mayor  and 
identification  with  the  incumbent's  political  party. 
Unfortunately,  no follow-up surveys were conducted 
to  assess  the  extent  to  which  the  effects  persisted 
beyond two weeks. Nevertheless, the study remains 
one  of  the  first  experiments  to  show  that  party 
attachments  change  when  performance  evaluations 
are altered exogenously. 
Given the sheer number of studies on the topic of 
party identification, readers may be surprised to learn 
that the Chong et al. study is among the very few that 
have attempted to influence party identification via an 
experimental manipulation. One exception is Cowden 
and McDermott  [35],  which reports  the results of a 
series of laboratory studies that sought to influence 
party attachments though, among other things, role-
playing  exercises  in  which  undergraduate  subjects 
were  asked  to  take  a  pro-  or  ant-Clinton  position. 
None  of  their  interventions  succeeded  in  changing 
party  attachments.  Similarly,  although  split  ballot 
designs have often been used to assess the effects of 
question wording on responses to party identification 
measures  (e.g.,  [36]),  survey  experiments  have 
seldom assessed whether party identification moves in 
the  wake  of  information  about  party  platforms  or 
performance. A notable recent exception is Lupu [37], 
which uses a split ballot design to assess the effects 
of  information  on  party  identification  in  Argentina. 
Lupu's work builds on Russian, Polish, and Hungarian 
experiments  reported  by  Brader  and  Tucker  [38]. 
Unfortunately,  these  experiments  do  not  measure 
whether  information  effects  persist  over  time,  a 
limitation that makes it difficult to interpret the small 
and contingent treatment effects that these authors 
report. One of the attractive features of the Chong et 
al.  study  is  that  its  intervention  and  outcome 
assessment occur at different points in time.
Let's now consider the Chong et al. study from the 
standpoint of the core assumptions discussed in the 
previous  section.  The  exclusion  restriction  in  this 
instance  stipulates  that  random  distribution  of 
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corruption-related  leaflets  influences  outcomes  be-
cause  it  provides  evaluative  information  about 
incumbent performance. The authors present convinc-
ing evidence that the leaflets did tarnish the image of 
incumbents who were accused of corruption and that 
precinct-level  votes  for  incumbents  accused  of 
corruption  were  lowered  significantly.  As  for  the 
assumption of excludability, which holds that random 
assignment does not affect outcomes, it seems there 
are few backdoor paths that could explain the effect 
on partisanship: the leaflets were distributed toward 
the end of  the campaign period,  preventing incum-
bents from responding to the messages; the leaflets 
themselves did not mention political parties; and the 
post-election surveys did not prime the respondents 
to think about the leaflets they might have received. 
The lack of immediate connection between the inter-
vention and the survey represents an advantage of the 
Chong et al. design in comparison to the split ballot 
experiments of Lupu [37] and Brader and Tucker [38].
In  sum,  the  Chong  et  al.  design  represents  an 
instructive  example  of  an  experimental  study  that 
measures  the  extent  to  which  party  identification 
responds  to  a  theoretically  informative,  real-world 
intervention.  Although  more  research  of  this  kind 
needs  to  be  done  before  one  can  draw  robust 
conclusions  about  party  attachments  in  Mexico  or 
elsewhere,  this  study  seems  to  suggest  that 
performance-related information regarding corruption 
has  a  short-term  effect  on  partisanship,  while 
somewhat more issue-related information concerning 
spending had negligible effects.
4. Gerber, Huber, and Washington (2010) [39]
In  the  context  of  the  hotly  contested  presidential 
primaries  of  2008,  Gerber,  Huber,  and  Washington 
[39] conducted an experiment in which they sought 
to create partisan attachments among self-identified 
independents. In January of 2008, as the presidential 
primaries  of  both  parties  were  intensifying,  the 
authors conducted a survey of  registered voters in 
Connecticut who, when registering,  declared them-
selves  unaffiliated  with  any  political  party.  This 
declaration  rendered them ineligible  to  vote  in  the 
upcoming presidential  primaries.  Among those who 
declared themselves in the survey to be independents 
(including those who "lean" toward the Democrats or 
Republi-cans  when  asked  a  standard  follow-up 
question about which party they feel closer to), half 
were randomly selected to receive a letter a week or 
two later informing them that they must register with 
a party in order to vote in that party's presidential 
primary  election  on  5  February.  The  letter  also 
included a registration form enabling them to register 
with a party. In June, respondents were reinterviewed 
and asked about their party identification, as well as 
their issue stances and other evaluations. 
This  experiment  parallels  the  encouragement 
design  described  earlier.  The  pool  of  experimental 
subjects comprised self-described independents who 
were  interviewed  in  January.  Random  assignment 
(Z i) determined which  of  the  subjects  was sent  a 
letter. The letter was literally an encouragement to 
register  with  a  political  party.  Although  the  letter 
might  ordinarily  be  considered  the  treatment  in  a 
standard design,  the treatment  in  the downstream 
experiment  (Di)  was whether the subject actually 
registers as a Democrat or Republican. (The authors 
discuss other potential outcomes variables, such as 
whether subjects vote in the presidential primaries; 
what follows is a simplified version of their analysis 
that  conveys  the  basic  logic  of  the  design.)  Some 
members  of  the  control  group  registered  without 
encouragement;  some  members  of  the  treatment 
group failed to register despite encouragement.
The  mismatch  between  assigned  and  actual 
treatment prevents us from estimating the ATE for 
the  sample  as  a  whole;  instead,  we must  set  our 
sights  on  estimating  the  ATE  for  Compliers,  those 
who  register  with  a  major  party  if  and  only  if 
encouraged. In order to identify the CACE, we must 
assume monotonicity, or the absence of Defiers. In 
this case, Defiers are those who would register with 
one of the two major parties if and only if they are 
assigned to the control group. Intuition suggests that 
few voters are so hostile to form letters from public 
officials that they would cancel their plans to register 
with a major party if (and only if) encouraged to do 
so. Monotonicity appears to be a plausible assump-
tion here.
Under  monotonicity,  those  who  register  with  a 
major party in the control group are Always-Takers, 
and those who register in the treatment group are a 
combination of  Always-Takers and Compliers.  Since 
the  treatment  and  control  groups  were  selected 
randomly, in expectation they should have the same 
shares  of  Always-Takers  and  Compliers.  Thus,  the 
share of Compliers can be estimated by subtracting 
the  party  registration  rate  (7.23%)  in  the  control 
group  (N  =  346)  from  the  party  registration  rate 
(13.61%) in  the  treatment  group (N = 360). This 
estimate  (0.1361  – 0.0723  =  0.0639)  forms  the 
denominator  of  the  estimator  in  Equation  (8).  The
t-ratio for this estimated effect is 2.78. Using the full 
sample  of  subjects  (rather  than  just  those  reinter-
viewed in June) leaves no doubt about the robustness 
of the relationship.  For these 2,348 subjects,  the t-
ratio  is  5.48.  The  experiment  did  not  generate  an 
enormous share of  Compliers,  but clearly  there  are 
enough to support a downstream analysis.
The  numerator  of  Equation  (8)  is  the  observed 
difference  in  outcomes,  in  this  case,  identification 
with  a  major  party  when  re-interviewed  several 
11
months  later.  Identification  could  be  measured  in 
various ways; for purposes of illustration, we will use 
the  convention  of  measuring  partisan  strength  by 
folding the  7-point  party  identification scale  at  the 
center (pure independent) and counting independent 
leaners as 1, weak partisans as 2, and strong parti-
sans  as  3.  Using  this  scoring  method,  partisan 
strength averaged 1.0361 in the treatment group, as 
compared to  0.9624 in  the  control  group.  In  other 
words,  assignment  to  receive  a  letter  boosted  the 
apparent  probability  of  identifying  with  a  party  by 
1.0361  – 0.9624 = 0.0737 scale points. Putting the 
numerator and denominator together gives us the in-
strumental variables regression estimate of the CACE:
(9)
This  estimate  suggests  that  among  Compliers, 
those  who  register  with  a  party  if  and  only  if 
encouraged to  do so,  the  act  of  registering  with  a 
party  increases  partisan  strength  by  1.153  scale 
points. The magnitude of this effect is not trivial: in 
their pre-election round of interviews with registered 
voters who were not registered with a party (including 
respondents  who  were  not  part  of  the  letter 
experiment  because  they  were  weak  or  strong 
partisans), the average level of partisan strength was 
1.01 with a standard deviation of 0.85. 
Before  drawing  substantive  inferences  based  on 
this estimate, let's first evaluate the plausibility of the 
exclusion restriction in this application, an issue that 
Gerber, Huber, and Washington discuss in detail ([39], 
pp.  737–741).  Clearly,  the  encouragement  letters 
(Z i) influenced  party  registration (Di) and  partisan 
strength (Y i) . The question is whether the exclusion 
restriction Y i (d )=Y i(d , z) is plausible; could it be that 
potential outcomes for partisan strength respond not 
only to whether people register with a party but also 
to whether they receive a letter? The letters  them-
selves were designed to be empty of partisan content; 
they simply remind voters of the administrative fact 
that a change of registration will be necessary if they 
want to participate in an upcoming election. In terms 
of measurement procedures, the authors took care to 
assess  outcomes  in  the  June  survey  in  ways  that 
preserved  the  symmetry  between  treatment  and 
control  groups,  avoiding  any  questions  that  would 
prompt members of the treatment group to recall the 
letter or the circumstances surrounding their change 
in registration. In terms of substantive confounders, it 
is possible that the letters piqued voters' interest in 
the campaign,  so that  even if  they  did not  change 
their  registration,  their  partisan  attachments  were 
altered. This backdoor pathway from Z i  to Y i  seems 
unlikely,  and  the  authors  found  no  evidence  that 
subjects  in  the  treatment  group  were  any  more 
interested  or  hungry  for  political  information  when 
interviewed in June (p. 739). 
If we accept the exclusion restriction, two issues of 
interpretation  remain.  The first  is  whether  one  can 
generalize from the estimated ATE for  Compliers  to 
causal  effects  for  other  subjects,  contexts,  and 
interventions. Would the results be the same if one's 
treatment  caused  every person who was  registered 
but  unaffiliated  with  a  party  to  change  party 
registration? This question is best settled by follow-up 
experiments that assess whether the results depend 
on number and frequency of encouragements (which 
will  affect  the  proportion  of  Compliers)  or  the 
particular arguments that are used in the encourage-
ment. The same goes for experimenting with different 
contexts: instead of offering voters a chance to vote 
in  both  parties' contested  primaries,  what  about 
circumstances  in  which  only  Republican  candidates 
are vying for the nomination?
Another question of interpretation is what to make 
of  the  effect  of  changing  registration.  A  variety  of 
hypotheses could be adduced: a public declaration of 
a  partisan  identity  changes  the  way  one  regards 
oneself,  sets  in  motion  a  search  for  information  to 
justify  one's  partisan  choice,  or  causes  political 
campaigns to make increased efforts to mobilize and 
persuade (p. 737). Each of these subsidiary hypoth-
eses  has  testable  implications,  and  the  authors 
investigate  whether  subjects  in  the  treatment  and 
control group evaluate partisan figures differently or 
have  different  types  of  interactions  with  political 
campaigns.  They  find  that  partisan  evaluations  do 
change concomitantly with changes in party identifi-
cation (p. 735), but there is no apparent relationship 
between the treatment and contact with campaigns or 
other manifestations of greater interest in  issues or 
information. Over the course of a few months, change 
in partisanship seems to have coincided with changes 
in  partisan  attitudes  but  not  changes  in  behaviors 
such as searching for information or discussing politics 
with others.
We say "coincided" because one cannot distinguish 
the causative effects of each of the changes that were 
set  in  motion  by  the  letter.  The  authors  note  that 
"receipt  of  the letter  informing the  recipients  about 
the need to be affiliated with a party in order to vote 
in  that  party's  primary  increased  partisan  identity, 
partisan  registration,  voter  turnout,  and  partisan 
evaluations of political figures" (p. 737). With just a 
single randomly assigned treatment (the letter), one 
cannot  separately  identify  the  effects  of  each 
intervening variable. For example, one cannot sepa-
rately  identify  the  effects  of  registration  and  the 
effects  of  actually  voting;  voting is  just  one of  the 
many  possible  by-products  of  registration.  If  one 
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ĈACE=
(Ê [Y i│Z i=1 ]−Ê [Y i│Z i=0 ])
(Ê [Di│Z i=1]−Ê [Di│Z i=0 ])
= (1.0361−0.9624)
(0.1361−0.0723)
= 0.0737
0.0639
=1.153
wanted to isolate the effect of registration per se, a 
different design would be needed—perhaps encourage 
unaffiliated voters to re-register with a party shortly 
after the primary has passed in order to estimate the 
effect of (solely) registering with a party? Conversely, 
one could determine whether voting per se increases 
partisanship  by  urging  people  to  vote  using  non-
partisan  messages  (see  [40]).  The  single-factor 
encouragement used in this study paves the way for 
more  elaborate  encouragement designs  that  aim to 
identify distinct sources of partisan change.
5. Discussion
The two studies  summarized  above provide  a  tem-
plate for future research. The Chong et al. [34] study 
offers an example of how one might fruitfully study 
causes of partisan change by deploying an array of 
different  kinds  of  interventions.  In  that  study, 
information about corruption in municipal government 
led  voters  to  change  their  party  attachments.  The 
Gerber et al.  [39] study deploys a treatment that in 
itself had no partisan content and functioned solely to 
facilitate  behaviors  that  are  believed  to  reinforce 
partisanship. By setting in motion randomly generated 
direct  and  downstream  effects,  these  experiments 
provide  a  method  for  studying  partisanship  that  is 
both informative and methodologically defensible.
This  style  of  intervention-oriented  research  could 
be expanded to include information about the parties' 
policy  stances,  their  financial  backers,  their  level  of 
support among different segments of the electorate, 
and so forth. A combination of treatments could be 
designed to test competing theories about how party 
identities are formed. One kind of treatment might be 
designed  to  affect  retrospective  performance  evalu-
ations,  while  another  might  be  crafted  to  alter 
perceptions  of  the  parties' platforms  or  support 
among  voters  with  different  social  identities.  What 
makes  this  approach  distinctive  is  that  scholars 
intervene  to  mint  partisans  through  randomly 
assigned treatments rather than to observe passively 
the partisan changes that occur on their own.
Both  experiments  illustrate  how  this  approach 
might be deployed in a field setting (perhaps as a by-
product of a broader field experiment), but the basic 
design applies  also  to  laboratory  research  [35] and 
survey research  [32,37,38].  One could imagine a lab 
or on-line study in which subjects  are pre-screened 
for weak partisan attachments, randomly exposed to 
theoretically-inspired  appeals  that  are  designed  to 
move them closer to a political  party.  For example, 
one  could  imagine  a  "social  identity" video  that 
explains  what  sorts  of  people  favor  the  Democratic 
and  Republican  parties  and  a  competing  "spatial 
proximity" video that explains the ideological stances 
of  the party  with  respect  to  several  leading issues. 
Indeed, one can even imagine a vacuous "feel-good" 
video  that  deploys  slogans  and  attractive  imagery 
while endorsing one of the parties—in this case, the 
same video could be adapted to support each party. 
The main practical constraints are the need to expose 
the control group to something that is vaguely similar 
(but  not  party-focused)  so  that  subjects  in  both 
groups have similar suspicions about what the study is 
about when reinterviewed at some later point in time.
More challenging is  the task of designing experi-
ments to test the effects of partisan attachments on 
other  attitudes  and  behavior.  For  example,  parti-
sanship  is  said  to  alter  issue  stances,  economic 
evaluations, and interest in political news. In an ideal 
design, a randomly assigned intervention would affect 
party  attachments  without  directly  affecting  these 
outcomes. This exclusion restriction obviously rules out 
the use of economic news as an inducement to identify 
with the allegedly more competent party. It may also 
rule out naturally occurring random assignments, such 
as the  Vietnam draft  lottery  [41],  which  may  affect 
both  partisanship  and  issue  stances  directly. 
Developing effective interventions that seem to satisfy 
the exclusion restriction may require a fair amount of 
trial-and-error. Social scientists are relatively unaccus-
tomed  to  developing  interventions  that  successfully 
change partisanship; the experiments discussed above 
are important first steps in that direction.
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